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Abstract: 
 
The International Policy Fellowship Program of the Open Society Institute funded this 
research project in June of 2005 based on a proposal that was submitted by the 
researcher (author of this paper) in late 2004. After some revision to the proposal, it 
was mutually agreed that the project would focus on a comparative study of the role 
of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and Mosques in the socio-political life 
of Afghan rural communities. One of the main reasons for choosing this objective was 
the great  need of the Afghan government and people for reform of their governance 
structure . The attempt to establish a modern and effective governance system in the 
country has been going for many years, particularly since the start up of the post 9/11 
administration in Afghanistan, but due to some challenges it never yielded any 
tangible results. 
 
The hypothesis of this project was that there is another governance structure 
established in the country by religious institutions that is very closely positioned at the 
village level Therefore, it was the objective of this research to find out if the existence 
of such a secondary structure can create resistance against governance reform projects 
in the country. In order to assess the interaction of the two governance systems in the 
country the researcher and his advisors  focused on a comparative study of  the role 
that Community Development Councils (CDCs) play in the socio- political life of a 
village versus that of a mosque.  
 
The establishment of Community Development Councils (CDCs) has been one of the 
most recent and creative approaches of the government and the international 
community, particularly the World Bank, to reform the governance structure of the 
country at the  grassroots level. The program started with an overall goal of reducing 
poverty through empowering communities. The program assumes that communities 
are empowered through improvement of their governance system and an increase of 
human and economic capital . “The objectives of the program are to: (1) lay the 
foundations for a strengthening of community-level governance; and (2) support 
community-managed sub-projects comprising reconstruction and development that 
improve the access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and 
services.” (Ministry of Rural Development Documents, National Solidarity Program, 
2005) 
 
In order to begin the comparison of the socio- political role of CDCs versus mosques 
in the village, we came up with some  questions that served as a research guide 
throughout our fieldwork.   
 
1. What is the existing vision of future governance in the country? 
2. What are the politics of local governance and power? 
3. What is a mosque and how does it function?   
4. What services does a mosque provide to the people? 
5. How is the power structure formed in a village? 
6. Where does CDC  fit  in the hierarchy of the village power structure ? 
7. Can CDCs take the lead in  village governance ? 
8. What other challenges exist? 
9. What practical solutions are available? 
10. What possible consequences are expected if no action is taken? 
 
The answers to these questions  would suggest a set of policy options that require 
immediate action.  Based on those policy options, the author wrote a separate policy 
recommendation paper that will be submitted together with this report and will 
provide policy makers with a well thought-out course of policy action.   
 
It is also important to note that the research project was implemented during a period 
of serious security and political challenges in the country, particularly concerning the 
dilemma of power sharing amongst different players of Afghanistan’s recent politics.  
Those challenges  impacted the overall outcome of the project since most people in 
the villages were very hesitant to comment on anything related to the power structure.   
Three decades of religiously motivated war has also radicalized people’s attitude 
towards the role of religion in the power structure of an Islamic country.   The 
weakening presence of government beyond the capital of the country created a 
suitable environment for other players, particularly religious leaders, to dominate the 
power structure in communities and become a very strong competitor for the central 
government. 
 
The research project did not have the time and resources to look at the economic 
aspects of the power structure, which is another important piece of the puzzle because 
landlords, poppy growers, and  wealthy tribal figures play as important a role in the 
game of power sharing as religious leaders do. 
 
 
What is the existing vision of future governance in the country? 
 
Because of the power-determining nature of the governance reform program, it is 
highly influenced by the politics of different institutions who are the stakeholders in 
the governance-reform program of Afghanistan.    Some key players include the 
government institutions, international institutions (with the UN being on the driving 
seat) and political competitors of the government such as religious institutions, tribal 
institutions and many wealthy landlords who play a major  role in the poppy business. 
Below is a brief description of the role that each institution plays: 
 
Government institutions: 
 
Within the cabinet of Afghanistan’s government, the Ministry of Interior has 
predominantly been in charge of local governance affairs in the country since it 
supervises all province and district governors and provides them with the required 
organizational and financial resources to do their job.  The structure of the Ministry of 
Interior for local governance is mainly divided into two levels of administration; the 
office of the provincial governor and the office of the district governor.   The ministry 
does not have any organizational structure for  village level administration and 
therefore relies on the district level administration for management of the life of any 
citizen of the country living beyond the level of districts administration.   The two 
levels of organization are best described in the organizational charts below as: 
 
1. Office of Provincial Governor and its functions, and 
2. Office of District Governor and its functions 
 
 
 
Office of Provincial Governor 
Deputy   
Documents & Relations 
Applicatio
ns   
Archive 
Execution Filing/ Documents 
preservation 
Confidenti
al 
Documen
tation 
Meetings 
Administration 
Elections Population 
Registration 
Services Human 
Resource 
Deputy 
Procurement Inventory Store Store Keeper 
Birth Certificates ID Card 
  
 
Recently, the United Nations and the rest of the international community, together 
with the Afghan government agreed upon a new organizational structure for the 
provincial level of administration, which is described below: 
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What are the  politics of local governance and power? 
 
Due to funding restrictions and priority of other projects as well as Afghanistan’s 
politics of  power sharing at different levels of administration, the district level 
organizational reform is not being considered at this point.  This leaves the district 
level administration with its current structure and, again, no administrative structure 
for the village level.  However, another ministry within the cabinet received 
substantial government and international assistance to establish a village level 
foundation for governance and development.  The Ministry of Rural Development  
and Reconstruction, with generous international assistance, launched a program called 
National Solidarity Program that aimed towards empowering local communities 
through strengthening the governance structure at the community level.  The program 
consists of three major steps; establishment of Community Development Councils 
(CDC) through direct election at the village level, training of CDC members through 
partner NGOs on the ground, and finally, implementation of small scale community  
project by CDCs.   Because of  the great needs of communities for economic 
improvement, the last part of NSP’s strategy (small scale community project) has 
overshadowed the rest of the program.    The International  community is very much 
interested in this part of the program because they think this is the only mechanism 
available in the country that provides assistance to the villages by  involving villagers 
in the process of problem identification as well as project implementation.  This is the 
only mechanism in the country that has been able to engage women in the 
development process to some extent at the village level.  In addition, the program has 
created a very good pool of capacity within the government by combining NGO 
capacity with the new government human resource capacity. This has also allowed 
donor organizations to spend their money through the program in a confident and 
timely manner.    All of the above-mentioned facts motivated the Ministry of Rural 
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Development to spend more money on  this program, which eventually created lots of 
jealousy and political in-fighting for the program.  In fact, the program is currently 
under a tremendous amount of pressure from different ministries to cut down  
expenses because it is depleting Afghanistan’s international assistance budget.    
 
Major achievements of the program through the 3rd quarter of 2005 are listed below: 
 
 9,122 communities have been mobilized 
 8,351 communities have elected their Community Development Councils  
 5,616 villages have received funding for 9,340 subprojects  
 US$ 104,394,195 disbursed and $152,091,354 committed in the form of  block 
grants 
 The project focuses on social and economic infrastructure: 2,102 drinking 
water, 1,940 irrigation, 1,906 transportation, and 1,808  energy projects have 
been set up. The remaining 1560 projects pertain to livelihood (including 
transfer of assets and income generation), education, sanitation, rural 
development, public building, health, shelter, and microfinance.  
 Presently, 3,450 people employed by the Facilitating Partners (FP) are  
working exclusively as community organizers, monitors and engineers for 
NSP. 
 400 staff of the Oversight Consultants (OC) including over 100 civil servants 
of the MRRD are executing and supervising government funded development 
activities 
 600,000 members of rural communities have received preparations training in 
planning, accounting, and team-building as a solid basis for rural governance. 
 
Although the program has created a very good mechanism that delivers assistance to 
the village level, there is very little agreement amongst donors and government 
officials that the governance aspect of the program has had any major achievements.   
Some  even criticized that the governance aspect of the program is not clear and 
consistent with the country’s constitution.   The main question  being asked in this 
regard is  how CDCs relate to the Provincial and District Development Councils 
(PDCs and DDCs) that are defined in the constitution.   It is important to note that 
there has not been any development whatsoever towards the establishment of 
provincial and district councils in the country to date, which leaves CDCs in the 
village with no connections to other governmental and/or none governmental bodies.  
Ministerial officials do not share the same vision for the future of CDCs.  Some 
officials believe that CDCs should remain as representatives of civil society in the 
village, and  others believe that they should be the official representatives of the 
government, while a third group -envisions  a mixture of both.  
 
Therefore, the Ministry initiated a series of actions that targeted twords dialogue 
between CDC members and senior government officials to define the future of CDCs 
within the country’s constitution.  The dialogue took a week in Kabul where all CDC 
representatives went through some exercises to define their views and then present 
them to the President of the country for approval.   The exercise did not produce any 
concrete results, as the President did not approve their main recommendation  of  
legalizing CDCs as the official government representatives in the village.   
 
The third major stakeholder of the governance affairs, though not officially 
recognized, is the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Haj, Ershad and Awqaf).  Under 
different titles, the ministry has existed as part of the government for a  long time.  
However, its main responsibilities have remained the same.  These are:) : 
 
1. Supervision of all religious institutions, which includes a large number of 
mosques around the country 
2. Coordination of government policies among the powerful groups of religious 
leaders in the country 
3. Provision of religious services to the public including, but not limited to, the 
arrangements of Pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. 
 
This research project discusses only the mosque management department of the 
Ministry or Religious Affairs not the rest.   Based on our random sampling data, on 
average, every district of Afghanistan has a minimum  of 100  and a maximum  of up 
to 2,500 mosques.   For example in Kunduz province, the number of mosques per 
district registered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs is shown  in the table below: 
 
No Districts (Woloswali) Major Junior Total 
1 Kunduz Center 128 747 875 
2 Amam Sahib 94 456 550 
3 Khan Abad 42 364 406 
4 Ali Abad 24 126 150 
5 Chahar Dara 28 202 230 
6 Qala-e-Zal 20 174 194 
7 Archi 14 156 170 
 Total 350 2225 2575 
 
There are also provinces and districts where the number of mosques is  much higher 
than what is presented in the example of Kunduz Province.  According to Mawlawee 
Abdul Bari Raashid, representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Takhar 
province, “We have districts with up to 2,500 mosques which were mostly built 
during Jehad.”   Based on the sampling data we can easily round up the numbers to a 
total of 1,000 mosques per district for the whole country.   It is important to note that 
in most parts of the country mosques that are newly built by people are not registered 
by the ministry of religious affairs.   The officials of the ministry acknowledged that 
they do not have the whole information about the number of mosques in the villages 
of the country. 
 
According to the Ministry of Interior and UN sources, the population of the country is 
estimated to be 25 million people (not officially verified),  the total number of districts 
in the country is estimated to be around 400 (398 officially registered by the 
government), and the number of registered main villages by the government is 
roughly 31,230.   Based on a simple calculation we are talking about a network of 
mosques that, on average,  places up to 12.7 mosques in each  village of the country.   
Regardless of the fact whether they are registered by the government or not, they are 
all connected with each other for administrative and communication purposes.   The 
only major difference between a registered mosque and a non-registered mosque is 
the source of the salary of the Imam (religious leaders responsible for  a particularly 
mosque).   The mosques are firmly integrated into a vast communication network by a 
very coherent organizational structure which is headed by the ministry of Religious 
Affairs.   According to Mawlawee Saraj-ul-Din and Mawlawee Abdul Rahim, Head 
and Deputy Head of Irshad, Haj and Awqaf in Jawzjan province, every district of their 
province has a District Manager (Modeer), an Order Taker (Amer Bar), a 
Communication Officer (Tabliqh), and three to four Senior Religious Leaders 
(Khateeb).   
 
 
What is a mosque, and how does it function? 
 
Islamic leaders established the mosque as a center for governance  during the early 
days of Islam’s expansion.  Today, in most Islamic countries, mosques  perform 
certain functions that are encroach on with what is called modern governance.  
Particularly in Afghanistan,  mosques have been playing a very critical role in the 
day-to-day lives of Afghan people.   This is probably one of the reasons why the 
government presence was never considered a priority at the village level.  In order to 
understand how a mosque fills the governance gap in a village we will review some  
basic functions of a mosque here:  
 
 
Center for decision-making:  This function of the mosque is unique because it 
applies to all parts of the country without any exception.  Rural people consider 
mosques the only place where they can make important community decisions. People 
do get together in other places for decision-making purposes, but in most 
circumstances, those decisions are not considered public decisions until they are 
ratified by the mosque after brief discussion that normally takes place  after prayer.    
This is probably why government and international organizations always seek 
religious leader’s assistance in introducing  new programs in rural communities.   “It 
is next to impossible to get people’s agreement on any CDC decision unless the 
decision is announced through the mosque by the religious leader of the village,” says 
Tariq Osma, Head of National Solidarity Program of International Rescue Committee 
in Kabul.  The United Nation’s Children Fund Program has used the network of 
mosques for implementation of their mother-child health campaign around the 
country for a long time.   According to UNICEF’s press release in May 2003: 
Afghanistan remains a traditional Islamic country where 
religious scholars and clergy play an important role in the day-to-
day life of its citizens. In most communities, especially those in 
rural parts of the country, imams and mullahs are seen as both 
spiritual and religious leaders and also a trusted source of 
guidance and advice on issues of the day. The potential for the 
religious community in Afghanistan to assist in the promotion of 
messages relating to children’s rights has been taken up by 
UNICEF, which in May 2003, supported the first national 
workshop on children’s issues for religious leaders from across 
the nation. 
 
Not only because people trust their religious leader, but also because the building 
itself is considered a holy place and people are convinced that any decision made in 
the mosque will not have unholy consequences, motivate people to give special credit 
to the words that come from the mosque.   Therefore, they always want to make their 
most important decisions inside the mosque.  Dispute management is another 
interesting aspects  of a mosque’s job in villages.   People do use other methods of 
dispute management (see above) in tribal areas of the country, but if no fair decision 
is reached then they automatically turn to the mosque.  The Commission for Judiciary 
Reform recommended the local dispute management mechanism  be legalized  
because it functions much more efficiently than the existing corrupt judiciary system, 
which is not even accessible to most people who live at the village level.   Courts are 
not available beyond the district level, and what is available at the district level is 
highly inefficient and distrusted by people.  
   
 
Center for provision of social services:  This characteristic of the mosque differs 
from region to region and from village to village depending on the cultural set up of 
the community and/or access of the community to other sources that provide social 
services.    In those villages where there are no other alternative sources of social 
services, the mosque is the only source that provides all kinds of assistance including 
education, health and public information.   In villages where other governmental 
and/or non-governmental organization are available to provide these services mosques 
are not so much focused on provision of these assistances.  However, they continue to 
be the secondary alternative even if the public services are available through other 
sources.  Due to serious inefficiency within government organizations people mostly 
prefer mosque over government assistance.   In those villages that the research team 
visited during this project, people gave both sources of assistance the same level of 
importance.  For example, if the village had access to a school, they still wanted to 
send their kids to the mosque for education because they thought religious education 
is different from and more important than regular education.  
Center for public administration:  We decided to call this function of the mosque 
public administration because, according to the many books and experts on the 
mosque, this was the main reason why Prophet Mohammad established the first 
mosque after his trip to Medina.  Islamic scholars who specialize in the Islamic 
methods of governance argue that it was not necessary to establish a building for 
prayer because, according to Islamic instructions, you can pray anywhere you want.   
It is mainly the public leadership tasks that required a building and a specific location 
to bring everyone together.    There are many religious rules for the mosque and 
prayer that have administrative and political, rather than religious bases.  For example, 
the obligation to offer Friday’s midday prayer (Friday is the off day in the Islamic 
calendar) at a main mosque (Masjid-e-Jamae) is highly political and a governance 
related rule rather than a religious one.   Main mosques are built only where the main 
market for several villages exists.   You cannot build a main mosque wherever you 
want.  It has to be a location where people from many different communities and 
villages come to exchange their goods.  During Friday’s prayer, unlike other prayers 
in normal mosques, Khotba is delivered (according to most Islamic specialists, Khota 
refers to a political speech that every Muslim has to listen to). Khotba is also 
supposed to confirm who is the leader of the country.  Before delivering Khotba, a 
religious leader has to do a quick analysis of the past week’s life events throughout 
the country and, at the end, come up with certain conclusions that require people’s 
action.   In most cities, Friday day prayer attendance is not considered important by 
people who are highly educated and/or those who have a better understanding of the 
issues menitoned in the Khotba.  However, in rural areas where the Imam (religious 
leader) is the only one who gets fresh news from the capital through Amer Bar and 
Tabligh officers of the Ministry, people follow his instructions and conclusion step by 
step.  The ideas are then reinforced by junior religious leaders during regular prayers 
offered at smaller mosques.   The main reason why the Ministry Haj-Irshad and 
Awqaf has these positions around the country is because they consider this task 
ministry’s number one job.  According to senior officials of the Ministry of Haj-
Irshad and Awqaf,  “We are controlling the minds and ears of the public and it is so 
important to do it properly, otherwise any enemy of the country can use this critical 
channel and destabilize the country.” (Mr. Darwazi, Executive Seretary to the 
Mininster, 2005) 
 
 
How is the power structure formed in a village? 
In general, power in a village rests with him, who has the final word in  a dispute, 
which requires a public decision.  It is only when the community faces a controvertial 
issue that a power struggle surfaces and it becomes clear who is in charge.  Otherwise, 
on  a normal day, it is very hard to determine who is in charge in the village.   It is 
important to note that the power structure of the village, like all other aspects of the 
country, has been affected by three decades of war.  During the war  power structure 
disrupted enormously, but recently it is moving back towards normalization.  
Although, certain challenges such as a weak government continues to impede 
normalization process in rural areas, still the overall picture shows a move towards 
reformation of the power structures.   
 
For better understanding of the village power structure, we will review  the following 
positions and personalities who play key roles in the formation of the village power 
structure:  
 
Tribal leader:  is a powerful position that is held by  the chief of the tribe in some rural 
areas of Afghanistan, but it is not  a village-based position because a tribe is normally 
larger than a single village.  Tribes are settled beyond the boundaries of villages and 
districts, and therefore, tribal leaders are key players when decisions concern the 
whole tribe rather than a single village. It is also important to note that tribes inhabit 
only in southern and southeastern parts of the country and not the entire country. Thus, 
the tribal leader does not play a big role in the village level decision making process.  
     
Village owner (Qarya Dar): has traditionally been the executive position in the village 
power structure, though the extent of power differs from village to village.   If he is 
appointed by the district governor and happens to be a landlord, then he is going to be 
very powerful. A Qaryadar, first of all, as soon as he is appointed finds out whether 
the religious leader of the village is on his side or not. If the Qaryadar is also a 
Zamindar (landlord) and has the support of the district governor, then he is likely to 
buy the religious leader of the village.  In some rare cases where the village religious 
leader is appointed by some other powerful people, serious competition is born in the 
village.  The Qaryadar is normally expected to be the face of the district governor in 
the village and represents government in all decision making processes in the village, 
but in reality, people know that he is  not hired by the government. Therefore, it is 
generally his secondary position that determines whether he is going to be effective or 
not. If he doesn’t hold another important position in the village, then he is often 
considered a spy of the district governor and therefore wildly resented.  In most cases, 
if the Qaryadar is not a Zamindar or religious leader at the same time, then he seeks 
support from a Zamindar or religious leader to maintain his effectiveness and 
credibility.  
 
Village religious leader (Mullah Imam):  is the spiritual leader of the village and 
traditionally plays the role of the judge, the teacher, and in the absence of a  doctor, 
the role of the village doctor.   The mullah’s power is derived from his religious and 
judiciary role that he exercises on a daily basis. It is not easy for anyone, including  
other powerful people such as Zamindar and Qaryadar, to confront the Mullah in 
public.  In cases where other power players want to criticize him, they do it in private 
and very carefully  because these religious leaders (Mullahs) can easily undermine 
their influence in the village.  They can simply say that a person’s behavior is not 
consistent with Islamic rules, and that will badly damage a reputation.   There are lots 
of sayings about dealing with religious leaders.  For example, it is said, “Confront 
anyone you want, but  never confront a Mullah.”.  There is a religious order called 
Fetwaa, which is considered much more serious than any law in the country.   Once a 
Mullah issues a Fetwaa against someone, the person has to be taken to an Islamic 
court for settlement of that case.  Therefore, we can say that religious leaders are the 
judiciary body in the village and every powerful person in the village wants and needs 
to secure their blessing before they exercise their power.    
 
Village landlord (Arbab – Zamin Dar): is another powerful person in the village 
hierarchy. His source of power is  his wealth, which is mostly land.  Rural areas of 
Afghanistan are  agriculturally productive and therefore, landlords are very important 
as they are the owners of the whole village economy.  They are considered  the main 
employers of most villagers and in some cases, they are the poppy producers which 
links them to the broader power structure of the country.  Although a Zamindar is the 
employer of the whole village, he does not employ religious leaders directly. 
Sometimes he offers religious leaders extra incentives to stay on his side and to not 
announce Fetwa against what they are doing, particularly if they are in the poppy 
business.  They become very powerful if they get appointed as the Qaryadar, and/or 
head of CDC, or as the elder of the village.  In any case, they never confront religious 
leaders because that will damage their business and their relationship with their 
employees. They also play a key role in appointing  Mirabs (water managers) and 
Chak Bashis (Agricultural Specialists).    
 
Village water manager (Mirab): is powerful person because  he is  registered by the 
Ministry of Water and Agriculture, and this gives him some kind of governmental 
face.  He has the sole authority to decide on how to distribute water to different farms 
based on the amount of water available in the canal.  In general the Zamindar, the 
Mirab and the Chak Bashi work very closely to plan the agricultural economy of the 
village.  Mirabs and Chack Bashis are heavily supported and backed by Zamindar.  
The Mirab’s source of power is his total control over water distribution and the fact 
that he has this control he plays a major role in settlement of disputes among villagers 
during daily life clashes. He is always invited by other powerful people, such as the 
Qaryadar, Zamindar and the Mullah, to comment on who is right and who is wrong in 
water related disputes.  
 
Village agricultural specialist (Chak Bashi): is mostly appointed by the Zamindar and 
works very closely with all farmers (villagers) to maximize profit for the Zamindar 
through coordination of agricultural activities and  resources required for each season 
in a village.   For example, the Chak Bashi has to decide what crop the village should 
grow during a certain season of the year based on variables such as water surplus or 
shortage,  prevalence of new agricultural diseases, introduction of new seeds, etc.   
His decisions are key for the overall income of the village as well as the profit of the 
Zamindars.   Like the Mirab, the source of power of the Chak Bashi also comes from 
the fact that when there is a conflict between two villagers over land, water, or the 
distribution of the harvest, he plays a key role in resolving the dispute.   The Chak 
Bashi also represents the landlord in most public gatherings and/or executive meetings 
among power holders. 
   
Village elder (Mohasen Safid): is a traditional position that is normally given to old 
men who are  widely respected and trusted for their honesty and goodwill.  Almost 
every village has at least a few of these men who are  considered to be the legislative 
body of the village.   They play a big role when conflicts arise among other power 
brokers. They are also the ones who appoint religious leaders for the village, and this 
is one of the most important roles because, later , the mullah of the village reports to 
these individuals for mosque related issues.  Power brokers refer any legislative issue 
that concern broader village interests to these elders.  It is important to note that they 
are not considered to be executive people as they naturally tend to be kind and 
forgiving personalities. 
 
Village head of CDC (Raees Shora-e-Enkeshafi):  is a position that was created 
recently by the intervention of the international community and government through 
the National Solidarity Program. The position is considered to be powerful in some 
villages and not powerful in others ,depending on who has occupies the post.  
According to a  survey of NSP facilitating partners (NGOs) and our observations, in 
the majority of villages around the country the position is either taken by teachers 
(this is interestingly new development in the history of the village power structure 
since teachers were not so important before the war.  They were mostly considered 
only as the clerk of the village) or by religious leaders.  In some other cases, village 
elders, Zamindars, or Qaryadars have taken this position.  CDCs are considered 
important for the time being because they receive money from the government, and 
they have the full support of the international community as well as government.   
Those who have become heads of CDCs are rarely called with their new title if they 
have  a secondary title such as Zamindar, Mullah, Mirab, or Malem.  People still 
consider and refer to them by the traditional name and consider them as their old role 
and responsibility.  Leadership of CDCs has provided a very good secondary source 
of power to those who were already powerful, but not very much power to those who 
were not players in the village power game in the past.   It is also important to note 
that people do not trust the position in the long run because they are not confident that 
the position and the program will continue long-term as they get the news from other 
power brokers that the program is being temporarily supported by the international 
community, and that will end very soon.   Villagers also receive conflicting news 
from poppy business holders about what is going to happen next.  Therefore, the 
power of this position depends very much on how the program and the CDC itself will 
develop in the near future. 
 
Village commander (Qomandan): used to be a very important and powerful position 
during the war (1990s), and in a handful of villages are still the case.  Commanders 
actually destroyed the whole power structure with  their guns and enjoyed 10 to 15 
years of kingdom rule in the village.  In most cases, commanders were either sons or 
close relatives of key village power brokers.  Their position was badly weakened after 
the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatant started 
by the government with immense support of international security forces.   Today, this 
position is no longer considered as important as it used to be.   
 
Village journalist (Dan Para): is another key position that is taken by some individuals 
mainly because of their unique ability.   These are people who talk about realities in 
public, disregarding who is going to lose face as a result of their statements.   This  
position is considered important because power brokers take journalists seriously as 
they don’t want villagers to hear badly of them.  However, the Dan Paras do not have 
any special source of power if they are not supported by one of the key leaders  in the 
village.   
 
Village teacher (Malem): is basically the village clerk who takes care of children’s 
education as well as the paperwork of all other key players including the Zamindar 
and the Qaryadar.   He is  also expected to represent the village in highly important 
places because of his ability to talk about the wider aspects of the village interest.   
The source of power for these individuals is the level of people’s trust in their 
knowledge and education.   During the war they were considered the main enemy of 
the religious leaders as they were heavily supported by the communist government, 
while religious leaders were supported by the anti-government forces (Mojahideen).  
Therefore, schools and teachers were often targeted during the years of war.  Even 
today, they are  considered to be the main competitors of the village religious leaders 
because of their engagement in education and guidance, which is something that 
religious leaders want to preserve for themselves.  The government and international 
community’s support of the education sector has made religious leaders jealous and 
nervous;  they  believe that once kids are educated they rarely follow religious 
instructions.   Development of relationships between teachers and religious leaders is 
important for the future of the country as they both guide people, and if they do not 
coordinate their efforts, they naturally create chaos and confusion.    
 
In general, the power structure of the village is formed in such a manner that no one 
person  exercises full power.  It was only during the war that commanders enjoyed  
sole  power.   Since the establishment of the new administration, the system is 
returning to a balance of power. However, new challenges such as coalition building 
among district governors, Qaryadars, and Zamindars -in support of the poppy business 
has posed a new threat to the power structure of the village.  Efforts are underway to  
motivate village religious leaders to join the coalition, but they haven’t joined yet.   It 
is hard to prevent such a critical change in the power structure of the village if proper 
attention is not paid to the governance reform programs beyond provinces. 
 
 
Where CDC is located in the village power structure hierarchy? 
 
It is very difficult for a CDC to stand against the new emerging form of power, 
particularly if poppy growers attract religious leaders.   For the time being, CDCs seek 
the support of religious leaders to stand against pressure of other power brokers.   In 
some villages where a teacher is elected as the head of CDC, religious leaders are 
already leaning towards the other power brokers since they are happy with teachers.   
Therefore, they are not very supportive of what CDC is doing in the village, and that 
creates lots of challenges for implementation of CDC projects.  In villages where a 
religious leaders is elected as the head of CDC (or as a member of CDC), the program 
is successfully implemented.  This is mainly because CDCs are  very much vulnerable 
against the recent rise of the power game.   NSP partners have noticed this fact clearly 
in every part of the country and have adjusted their strategies accordingly.  In 
southern parts of the country, NSP implementers noticed that it is almost impossible 
to implement any project without integrating religious leaders into the program.   
According to Eng. Osman Taruq, head of NSP program of International Rescue 
Committee, in Khost and Logar provinces, IRC has even hired religious leaders as 
their program staff to increase engagement of power brokers in the program.  Plus, 
they supported the establishment of an independent Council of Religious Leaders, 
which indirectly supports the program when it faces power challenges.   The members 
of the Religious Leader Council are being supported indirectly by the NSP to keep 
them supportive of the program.  These are practical indicators of what we described 
earlier as a secondary source of power to dominate the power structure of the village.   
NSP is creatively doing the same thing as Zamindars and Qaryadars have been doing 
to support poppy cultivation.    They always need support from the judiciary body of 
the village to stand against the executive power of the village.  One might ask why 
Zamindars and/or Qaryadars can not bypass the religious leader of the village.   The 
answer to this question is a very important fact of the village context.  Rural people of 
Afghanistan are predominantly religious, and three decades of religiously motivated 
war has further strengthened their religious motivations.  Today, people do not listen 
to any other officials in the village as much as they listen to the religious leaders.   
Religious leaders know this fact and therefore, they struggle at higher levels of 
politics to maintain their power at all levels of the country’s power structure.   
 
 
Can CDCs take the lead in  village governance? 
 
Keeping in view all of the above realities, it is hard to imagine that CDCs can take the 
leadership position in the power hierarchy of the village, as the central government is 
currently hoping.  They are facing strong competitors (Mullahs, Qaryadars, Zamindars, 
poppy growers, etc.) who are rich, powerful and influential.  In order for the CDCs to 
dominate the power structure of the village, the councils  are forced to bring these 
individuals inside.   This is exactly what has been happening in all villages in 
Afghanistan.  CDCs are always made up of these individuals, which raises a simple 
question:why is the government  spending so much money to create what is already 
there  in the village?  During this research study, we could find barely any positive 
impact of the NSP program on reform of local governance structure in the village.  
The most important contribution of CDC to the village is its function as the 
mechanism that has provided villagers and power brokers access to the government 
and international assistance funding.    
 
On the other hand, traditional power brokers of the village are very smart and creative 
in their interactions with the government reform programs.  They have joined CDCs 
to have access to the government and international funding, but at the same time they 
have motivated the whole community to use CDC funding for projects that benefited 
the power brokers much more than ordinary villagers.   For example, they pushed for 
approval of projects such as electric power in a village where drinking water was the 
priority of the villagers.  In another village, a left irrigation project were proposed (for 
poppy cultivation purposes), while the  priority of the village was a school and a clinic.  
In most cases we noticed that priorities were determined according to the needs of the 
power brokers rather than those of ordinary villagers. (photo of CDC head with poppy 
field) 
 
Another reason that CDCs could hardly take the lead in the village power structure is 
their  financial dependence on international assistance, which is considered  
unsustainable in the long run.  It is difficult to ensure survival of public institutions 
unless they are supported by  public funding.  Amongst the power brokers of the 
village, Mullahs and mosques are the only entities who enjoy support of public 
funding regularly.  All expenses of mosques and Mullahs are paid by village 
contributions.  When villagers were asked, “What motivates you to give your money 
to pay for the mosque but not for the school or road,” they responded, “We can live 
without education and without a road, but we can not live without our mosque.”    
 
In order to understand the level of public support of  the mosques, it would be helpful 
to review the table that reflects some useful facts about mosques in villages of the 
Dawlatabad district in Balkh province: 
 
# Description Facts Remarks 
1 # of villages in the district 60  
2 # of mosques in the district 153 Average 2.55 per 
village 
3 # of major mosques (Jame) 45 Located in market 
centers 
4 # of junior mosques (Saghira) 108 In every village 
5 # of mosques funded by villagers 153  
6 # of mosques funded by Gov. 0  
7 Average annual salary of Imam 55,000 Afg/year In local currency 
8 Average annual salary of Imam 12.6 Ton 
wheat/year 
In kind 
9 Who ensures funding? Village elders Legislative body 
 
In some cases Imams are paid in both forms of kind and cash and in some other cases 
they are paid in mixed crops like half wheat and half barley-corn.  
 
 
What other challenges exist? 
 
Very recent history shows that the network of mosques were used by difference 
parties for mobilizing ordinary villagers of Afghanistan for different wars.  In each of 
those cases the key role was played by the religious leaders who motivated people to 
stand up and go to the war.  Given the existing challenges of Afghanistan and the 
region it is quite possible that the same technique be used once again by extremist to 
motivate people to destabilize the country.  It is very important for the government to 
have a better engagement with such a vast and influential network of institutions that 
is deeply localized at the hearts of the villages.  Disengagement and ignoring the 
network can cost the country a lot more than the cost of engaging them in the process 
of stabilization of Afghanistan. 
 
 
What practical solutions are available? 
 
Registration of all mosques around the country and establishment of a better 
governance structure that integrates religious institutions into the system can easily 
immune the country against any back-file of the system that has been experienced 
before.   A complete set of recommendations are submitted separately for action.  For 
further information please refer to the policy recommendation paper from this project. 
 
 
What possible consequences are expected if no action is taken? 
 
The following consequences are foreseen if no action is taken towards the 
recommendations of this paper: 
 
1. Failure of CDCs in the village as soon as religious leaders decide to render 
their support towards their projects. 
2. Sense of isolation and no importance can easily encourage highly influential 
religious leaders to lean towards incentives from other sources who might 
encourage them to take revenge by standing against the government and 
current process in the country. 
3. Poppy business owners can easily buy the power of religious leaders and 
establish an other governance structure at the village that can further endanger 
future of the country once the seeds for proper poppy governance is planted. 
